Unification of the private law in the Germany in the nineteenth century: An economic perspective by Kanning, A.J.
TILEC Discussion Paper
TILEC  1 






Arnald J. Kanning 
 
This  paper  makes  an  effort  to  identify  a  link  between  economic  interdependencies 
between  German  regions  and  developments  in  the  field  of  private  law  in  nineteenth-
century Germany. Growing economic interdependencies seem to have caused German 
regions to iron out differences in their regionally defined private law. Also, although 
several German regions seem to have preferred their own private law to the private law of 
Prussia,  they  nonetheless  chose  to  place  the  private  law  that  Prussia  wished  for  into 
uniform laws rather than any other private law. In doing so, other German regions must 
have  stimulated  their  own  economic  growth  by  encouraging  economic  activity  with 
Prussia. (JEL: K 00, N 00) 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The aim of the paper is to provide an explanation for efforts to reach a more uniform 
private law in ‘Germany’ in the nineteenth century.
1 It seeks to fulfill this aim through 
investigation of the relationship between economic interdependencies between German 
                                                 
*The paper has greatly benefited from comments by Christoph Bergfeld, Barbara 
Dölemeyer and Jean-Jacques Herings. Responsibility for errors remains solely mine. 
1In the paper ‘Germany’ refers to the German Confederation (1815-1866), the 
North German Confederation (1867-1871) and the German Second Empire (1871-1914).   2 
regions  and  developments  in  regionally  defined  private  law  in  Germany.  Private  law 
governs the relations between citizens. Developments in the field of (private) law are a 
form of institutional change (North [1990]: 96). In exploring the extent to which the 
growing economic dependence of other German regions upon Prussia over the course of 
the nineteenth century might have influenced processes of unifying the private law in 
Germany, the following issue will be considered. More often than not, the private law 
that Prussia had in mind survived into the final drafts of successful uniform laws. Is this 
to imply that all German regions preferred Prussian private law to any other private law? 
If only because several German regions had always showed reluctance towards adoption 
of Prussian private law into uniform laws, the answer to the question is not self-evident. 
This paper will reach the tentative conclusion that, although German regions might have 
preferred their own private law, they might nonetheless have had an interest in placing 
the private law that Prussia wished for into uniform laws rather than any other private 
law.  For,  in  doing  so,  other  German  regions  must  have  spurred  their  own  economic 
growth by stimulating economic activity with Prussia. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The following section offers a general framework in 
which  to  think  about  the  interplay  between  economic  interdependencies  between 
jurisdictions  and  developments  regarding  the  private  law  in  these  jurisdictions.  The 
subsequent Sections 3 to 5 survey developments concerning the private law in nineteenth-
century Germany. Section 3 provides a broad overview of the impact of the increasing 
economic interdependencies between the German regions in the course of the nineteenth 
century on developments pertaining to regionally defined private law. Sections 4 and 5 
will elaborate upon the link between the growing economic dependence of other German 
regions upon Prussia and legislative trends regarding regionally defined private law at 
more length. Section 4 will develop the point that the year 1866 marked a turning point 
for quests for a more unified private law within Germany. Section 5 will demonstrate that 
the miserable failure of the middle states of the German Confederation to end projects to 
compose uniform private laws successfully in the 1860s was due in large part to Prussia’s 
unfavorable response. Concluding observations will be made in Section 6.   3 
 
 
2  Framework of Analysis 
 
Jurisdictions  may  have  ‘divergent’  private  law.  From  a  theoretical  angle,  this  section 
sheds light on the issue of whether a jurisdiction may have an interest in switching to or 
retaining legal rules that are not most preferred by this jurisdiction. The term ‘divergent’ 
is defined in the following way. Private law should ensure that citizens who want to 
engage in economic activity are able to do so. After all, economic activity can leave 
everybody involved better off. Private law does more than simply facilitate economic 
activity,  however.  It  also  may  affect  the  way  citizens  divide  potential  gains  from 
economic activity (see e.g. Baird [1994]: 219). That is, to facilitate economic activity 
equally  well,  the  private  law  of  separate  jurisdictions  need  not  affect  the  division  of 
potential  gains  from  economic  activity  in  any  particular  way.
2  Stated  otherwise,  the 
private law of separate jurisdictions that facilitates economic activity equally well can 
still differ in its distributional consequences. It follows that, to understand processes of 
unifying  regionally  defined  private  law,  an  investigation  of  whether  or  not  separate 
jurisdictions, constrained by economic rivalry, will succeed in providing private law that 
facilitates economic activity does not suffice. The latter issue has received considerable 
scholarly attention (see e.g. La Porta et al. [2004]; Mahoney [2001]; Wagner [1998] and 
references therein). 
If indeed separate jurisdictions invoke private law that affects differently the way 
their  citizens  divide  potential  gains  from  economic  activity,  citizens  of  separate 
jurisdictions  presumably  prefer  the  way  their  own  private  law  affects  the  division  of 
                                                 
2The  potential  gains  to  be  derived  from  a  given  economic  activity  are,  say, 
maximally ¼:KHQWKHSULYDWHODZRIVHSDUDWHMXULVGLFWLRQVLVDEOHWRIDFLOLWDWHWKHVDLG
economic activity so as to create potential gains of ¼LQWKHDJJUHJDWHWKHSULYDWHODZRI
separate  jurisdictions  facilitates  economic  activity  equally  well.  From  this  angle  of 
perspective, private law that is able to facilitate the said economic activity so as to create 
potential gains of only ¼LQWKHDJJUHJDWHIDFLOLWDWHVHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\OHVVZHOO   4 
potential gains from economic activity. Presumably, as neither a switch of a jurisdiction 
to different private law nor a move of a citizen to another jurisdiction is costless. Even 
ignoring this, by acting strictly on their own, without considering any opportunities for 
coordination, it is far from obvious that separate jurisdictions will succeed independently 
in issuing private law that affects identically the way their citizens divide potential gains 
from economic activity. Clearly, in case the operative body of private law in separate 
jurisdictions  differs  in  its  distributional  consequences,  citizens  engaged  in  inter-
jurisdictional economic activity have conflicting interests regarding the applicable private 
law.  Failure  to  agree  on  the  applicable  private  law  may  prevent  mutually  beneficial 
economic activity from taking place. 
  A  uniform  private  law  solves  the  coordination  problem  as  faced  by  citizens 
engaged in inter-jurisdictional economic activity. Then, the answer to the question of 
whether to unify a part of the private law comprises two halves. For example, movements 
for unification of divergent family law may perhaps draw little support from jurisdictions, 
not so much because of the distributional consequences of regionally defined family law, 
but, rather, because the number of inter-jurisdictional family affairs is relatively limited. 
On the other hand, in spite of possibly large distributional consequences of, for example, 
regionally defined commercial law, initiatives to unify this part of the private law may 
nonetheless resonate well with jurisdictions. For example, Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. 
Kobayashi  recognize  that  uniform  laws  providing  default  rules  for  commercial 
transactions can play a part in facilitating inter-jurisdictional economic activity (1996: 
150).  The  volume  compounded  by  the  value  of  inter-jurisdictional  commercial 
transactions  may  fuel  calls  for  unification  of  the  commercial  law.  Unfortunately,  no 
empirical study will be able to provide the detailed information as is required to state 
with  any  degree  of  precision  when  exactly  unification  of  the  private  law  becomes 
essential  to  facilitating  an  ever-growing  economic  interdependence  between  separate 
jurisdictions. Before taking on the challenge of unifying divergent private law, separate 
jurisdictions might first settle on enacting a uniform law on conflict of laws. Conflict of 
laws  rules  –  also  known  as  rules  of  private  international  law,  according  to  the 
terminology of the civil-law tradition – are rules of a jurisdiction that determine whether 
domestic law or foreign law applies to an inter-jurisdictional legal problem.   5 
  To  be  sure,  the  supposition  made  in  the  paper  is  that  the  legal  rules  of  all 
jurisdictions facilitate economic activity equally well, but, at the same time, differ in their 
distributional consequences. To suppose otherwise would basically be to deny the need 
for  jurisdictions  to  coordinate  their  actions  so  as  to  craft  uniform  private  laws.  For 
jurisdictions that hold the same opinion about the way in which their legal rules ought to 
affect  the  division  of  gains  from  economic  activity  might  independently  succeed  in 
providing private law that facilitates economic activity equally well. Instead, the ability 
of jurisdictions to foster economic growth is exogenous to our analysis. Thus, the issue is 
whether or not the German regions sought to place the legal rules into uniform private 
laws of the German region that was strongest able to engender  economic growth.  In 
doing so, other German regions might have propelled their own economic growth by 
spurring  economic  activity  with  this  German  region.  That  is,  an  existing  economic 
dependence upon a particular jurisdiction might induce other jurisdictions to place the 
legal rules into uniform private laws of this jurisdiction. And in placing the legal rules 
into uniform private laws of a particular jurisdiction, other jurisdictions might accelerate 
their economic activity with this jurisdiction. Unfortunately, any empirical study will fall 
short  of  providing  the  detailed  information  as  is  required  to  quantify  the  projected 
increase  in  inter-jurisdictional  economic  activity. There  is  no  alternative  but  to blend 
together  information  about  economic  interdependencies  between  separate  jurisdictions 
and  developments  regarding  domestically  defined  private  law.  Theoretical  reasoning 
makes  clear  that,  although  the  divergent  private  law  of  separate  jurisdictions  may 
facilitate economic activity equally well, separate jurisdictions may have an interest in 
introducing the private law of a particular jurisdiction into uniform laws rather than any 
other private law. The point is that this particular jurisdiction is strongest able to advance 
the economic growth of all other jurisdictions. Then, it is this theoretical finding against 
which the historical information on developments concerning the private law in Germany 
in the nineteenth century as presented in Sections 3 to 5 will be interpreted. 
 
   6 
3  Economic  Interdependencies  between  German  Regions  and  Developments 
Pertaining to German Private Law 
 
An economic factor that seemed at least to some extent responsible for the production of 
uniform private laws in nineteenth-century Germany was a rise in interregional economic 
activity. As the respective German regions could less afford to cling to regionally defined 
private law, an aim of uniform laws was to (re)impose unity in the private law. With 
regional private laws splintering ever more, the respective German regions first targeted 
the laws relating to intellectual property rights, bills of exchange and sales. To avoid 
compliance  with  less-preferred  private  law,  several  German  regions  had  always 
endeavored to place their own private law into uniform laws. However, Prussia strongly 
influenced drafting processes of uniform private laws. The root of this seems at least in 
part  planted  in  the  increasing  economic  dependence  of  other  German  regions  upon 
Prussia. Despite the fact that several German regions seem to have preferred their own 
private law, they chose to include the private law that Prussia wished for into uniform 
laws rather than their own private law. To have other German regions accept uniform 
private laws largely composed along Prussian lines, Prussia could, over time, use the lure 
of an affluent domestic market and strong banking sector. 
Indeed, as the nineteenth century unfolded, other regions within Germany looked 
increasingly  likely  to  give  ground  to  Prussia  in  disputes  over  which  provisions  to 
incorporate into uniform private laws. The upshot was that Prussia enjoyed substantial 
influence over the production of the Special Patent Protocol (1842), the Uniform Law on 
Bills of Exchange (1848) and the Commercial Code (1861). Likewise, in the 1860s, even 
though the middle states of the German Confederation and the Hapsburg Empire united 
around proposals to unify patent law (1863), copyright law (1864), civil law (1866) and 
the law of civil procedure (1866), the final hurdle was winning Prussian assent. As the 
draft uniform private laws did not bear sufficient resemblance to Prussian legislation, 
Prussia  did  not  forgo  a  chance  to  tweak  them.  After  the  collapse  of  the  German 
Confederation  in  1866,  Prussia  became  a  driving  force  behind  the  promulgation  of 
federal  legislation  in  the  North  German  Confederation  (1867-1871)  and  the  German 
Second Empire (1871-1914). Consequently, the provisions included in the Uniform Law   7 
on Patents (1877) stood in stark contrast to the provisions embodied in the Draft of a 
Uniform Law on the Granting of Territorial Patents (1863) and the Draft of a Uniform 




4  The Year 1866 Marks a Turning Point for Efforts to Reach a More Unified Private 
Law 
 
With hindsight it appears that 1866 was a pivotal year for Germany (see e.g. Tipton 
[2003]). In 1866 the Kingdom of Prussia decisively defeated the Hapsburg Empire in the 
battle of Königgrätz and, in the very same year, was equally quick to annex the financial 
centre Frankfurt. Once Prussia got rid of its arch-rival the Hapsburg Empire, the balance 
of  power  in  this  corner  of  the  globe  shifted  dramatically.  Within  the  German 
Confederation (1815-1866) the most significant members and main antagonists had been 
the Hapsburg Empire and Prussia. But since the North German Confederation (1867-
1871) excluded the Hapsburg Empire, Prussia was, without a shred of doubt, the most 
influential member. And Prussia’s influence remained felt in the German Second Empire 
(1871-1914). 
  Not  only  had  Prussia’s  military  prowess,  but  Prussia’s  increasing  economic 
strength also had contributed to the Kingdom’s ascendancy in the nineteenth century. 
Long before 1866, as attempts to strike a deal on customs in the German Confederation 
had foundered on opposition of the Hapsburg Empire, Prussia had wasted no time to 
extend its customs system to other members of the German Confederation. It is therefore 
no surprise that in 1833 Prussia was among the 18 founding members of the German 
Customs Union. Other members of the German Confederation joined within the next few 
years, but the Hapsburg Empire never succeeded in gaining admission (Huber [1986]: 
287). Taking  all  members  into  consideration,  Prussia  was  by  no  means  the  principal 
economic benefactor of the Customs Union. On the other hand, for Saxony, by far the 
most industrialized member of the German Confederation, Prussia’s domestic market was   8 
of vital importance, just as free access – controlled by Prussia – to the North Sea ports 
(Zorn [1963]: 329; Dumke [1977]). 
  Moreover, where Prussia gained economic ground in the course of the nineteenth 
century, Saxony gradually lost ground, especially after 1860. From the 1860s onwards, 
the western provinces of Prussia, that is, the Ruhr region, began to rival Saxony as the 
largest industrial district in the German Confederation (Tipton [1976]: 68). Because the 
financial  clout  of  Frankfurter  (private)  banks  had  been  enormous  in  the  German 
Confederation,  the  Free  City  of  Frankfurt  may  possibly  have  diluted  the  economic 
influence of Prussia to some extent. Nevertheless, given the amount of ‘Prussian’ money 
circulating in March 1866 in the area that was to become the German Second Empire, the 
importance of the Prussian Bank in Berlin and – to a lesser extent – private Prussian note-
issuing banks cannot be overstated either (Zorn [1992]: 416). In 1876 the Prussian Bank 
became  the  central  bank  of  the  German  Second  Empire.  Frankfurt’s  importance  as  a 
financial  centre  dwindled  even  further  in  favor  of  Berlin  when  the  Deutsche  Bank, 
established in 1870, became the largest credit bank in the German Second Empire in the 
late nineteenth century (Guinnane [2002]: 102). This made Deutsche Bank the largest of 
the Berliner Großbanken (Berlin Great Banks). In addition, between 1880 and 1907 the 
Ruhr  region  replaced  Saxony  as  the  largest  industrial  district  in  the  German  Second 
Empire (Tipton [1976]: 122). In sum, at the dawn of the nineteenth century, an evolving 
interregional dependence that marked the development of a ‘single’ market within the 
future German Second Empire was still a distant phenomenon (Zorn [1964]: 99). But, as 
the nineteenth century drew to a close, interregional interdependencies had come to be 
firmly established in this corner of the map (see e.g. Hoffmann et al. [1965]). 
 
The year 1866 proved a watershed for tendencies towards unifying the regionally defined 
private law within Germany. Before 1866, Prussia either delayed or postponed nearly 
every attempt at unifying the private law. In contrast, after 1866, Prussia had always 
spearheaded drives to unify the private law. 
  From 1815 onwards, a root cause for continuous calls for unification of the private 
law in the German Confederation was at least partly to stop the regional legal orders from   9 
evolving in independent paths. Whilst the members of the German Confederation had not 
lost a competence to legislate in matters of private law, unity in the private law was to be 
achieved by means of uniform laws. In 1836 the Kingdom of Württemberg, at the first 
General Conference of the Customs Union in Munich, called for unification of sales and 
bills-of-exchange law (Wadle [1985]: 126). But as Prussia’s economic strength rose in 
the course of the nineteenth century, the Kingdom became able to delay action so as to 
increase its leverage over the production of projected uniform private laws. Over time, 
other members of the Customs Union looked likely to succumb more readily to pressure 
from Prussia to construe uniform private laws compatible with the Kingdom’s demands. 
Prussia’s ten-year delay of the production of a uniform law on bills of exchange was to a 
greater or lesser extent designed to heighten pressure upon other members of the Customs 
Union to include the legal rules that it wished for. For similar reasons, in the 1830s and 
1840s, Prussia declined to embark upon projects to unify other branches of the private 
law.  Thus,  it  was  only  in  1846  that  Prussia  finally  approved,  though  reluctantly,  the 
production of a uniform law dealing with bills of exchange. The Prussian draft of a bills-
of-exchange law (1847) was used as a model for the Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange 
that saw the light of day in December 1847 (Coing [1986]: 2874). 
  In anticipation of a Constitution for the German Confederation, the Uniform Law 
on Bills of Exchange was placed on a federal level as of November 26
th 1848 (Huber 
[1978]: 791). Indeed, Article 13, No. 64 in Chapter 2 of the abortive Constitution of the 
Church of St. Paul in Frankfurt of March 28
th 1849 empowered the National Assembly to 
produce federal codes in the field of civil law, commercial law, bills-of-exchange law, 
penal  law  and  civil  procedure  (Wesenberg  [1955]:  359). Additionally,  as  work  on  a 
federal  commercial  code  had  already  been  started  in  1848,  the  Frankfurt  Draft 
Commercial Code could be presented in March 1849. But due to the dissolution of the 
National Assembly and the nullification of its laws in 1850, the draft was not properly 
discussed at all, let alone enacted. Either way, all members of the German Confederation 
voluntarily sought to enact the Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange (1848) within the next 
fifteen  years.  In  this  respect,  it  is  worth  observing  that  even  Prussia’s  arch-rival  the 
Hapsburg Empire could ill afford to steer clear of enacting the said Uniform Law (Coing 
[1986]: 2945).   10 
Meanwhile, the unification-torch had passed to Bavaria. In 1857 this Kingdom 
started to call, once more, for unification of commercial law within the framework of the 
German Confederation. Again, Prussia demonstrated a by now characteristic reluctance to 
engage  in  such  a  matter. And  only  after  the  Prussian  envoy  Otto  von  Bismarck  had 
contrived to protect the interests of his Kingdom, resulting in the use of a Prussian draft 
of a code, which was yet to be finalized, as the main basis for future deliberations, did 
Prussia give its indispensable veto at the very end of the same year (Kraehe [1953]: 17; 
Bergfeld [1987]: 108). Now that a Commercial Code was to be produced along Prussian 
lines, Prussia, in addition, proved anxious to use its draft of a bankruptcy law (1855), 
which drew to some extent on French bankruptcy law (Thieme [1977]: 108), as a model 
for  a  possible  unification  of  this  branch  of  the  law.  This  plan  evoked  widespread 
disapproval from various corners of the German Confederation, however. Therefore, only 
a German Commercial Code was promulgated in 1861. Just about all members of the 
German Confederation implemented the German Commercial Code (1861) within the 
next five years, albeit with modifications and amendments. It pays to notice that even the 
Hapsburg Empire came round to endorsing the first four books of the said Code (Coing 
[1986]: 3051).  Largely thanks to Prussia’s unfavorable response, further initiatives of 
Württemberg, Bavaria and Saxony to unify patent law (1863), copyright law (1864), the 
law of obligations (1866) and the law of civil procedure (1866) eventually foundered (see 
in greater detail Section 5). 
  A  major  exception  to  the  observation  that  Prussia  stalled  initiatives  of  other 
members of the German Confederation to unify the private law before 1866 was in the 
field of patent law. According to Prussia, Württemberg, Bavaria and the Hapsburg Empire 
used  patent  law  as  a  device  to  engage  in  anti-competitive  conduct.  Whereas  these 
members pursued lavish policies in respect of the granting of patents, Prussia, in this 
regard, pursued a stringent policy (Coing [1986]: 4149). At the time, Prussia emphasized 
that the grant of exclusivity by patent legislation could be misused by being incorporated 
into cartels and market-sharing arrangements or monopolistic practices that denied access 
to markets. Indeed, both Kingdoms did not so much argue that the grant of an exclusive 
right for a limited period of time to an inventor to exploit the invention was a necessary 
incentive  for  investment  in  research  and  development  and  would  stimulate  economic   11 
growth  and  competitiveness  accordingly.  Rather,  Bavaria  and  Württemberg  held  the 
opinion that lavish policies towards the granting of patents could protect and, thereby, 
favor  their  own  constituents.  In  any  event,  Prussia’s  stringent  policies  towards  the 
granting of patents were, in effect, not harming Württemberg and Bavaria. But, the other 
way  around,  the  exclusive  territorial  patent  rights  awarded  by  these  two  Kingdoms 
amounted to restrictions on imports from Prussia. Yet, in the 1830s, Prussia encountered 
grave difficulties in building support for a uniform patent law that largely suited its own 
needs. And although the members of the Customs Union hammered out a compromise in 
1842, some disagreement remained, which even intensified in the early 1860s (Grothe 
[1877]:  14),  and  was  only  ‘resolved’  after  1866  when  Prussia  could  have  it  almost 
exclusively its own way. 
  The German Confederation had, as said, lacked a competence to legislate on a 
federal level altogether. Much to the regret of Prussia, the central legislative competence 
enshrined  in Article  4,  No.  13  of  the  1867  Constitution  of  the  newly  formed  North 
German Confederation did not include the entire field of (private) law. This could not 
prevent Prussia from establishing the Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange (1848) and the 
Commercial Code (1861) as federal law in 1869 (Schubert [1988]: 484). Also, a Uniform 
Law on Literary Copyright composed in large part along Prussian lines was placed on a 
federal level in 1871. And a commission was charged with the drafting of a Code of 
Bankruptcy Law. The German Second Empire received the Constitution remodeled from 
the  North  German  Confederation. Again,  Prussia  introduced  a  proposal  to  extend  the 
central legislative competence to cover the whole field of private law (Schubert [1979]: 
243).  However,  in  1871,  with  regard  to  efforts  directed  at  unifying  segments  of  the 
private law, Württemberg, Saxony and Bavaria, in particular, more or less adopted the 
pre-1866 delaying tactics of Prussia. Little wonder, then, that in order to gain influence 
over a possible production of a code of civil law, these members of the Empire turned the 
Prussian motion down. Württemberg  represented the view of Saxony  and Bavaria by 
associating legal unity within the Empire with Prussian centralization (Schubert [1977]: 
174).  The  proposed  amendment  of  the  Constitution  was  said  to  be  an  unjustifiable 
interference in the internal affairs of the members of the Empire. Even so, at the very end 
of  1873,  after  some  minor  concessions  on  the  part  of  Prussia,  the  central  legislative   12 
competence  of  the  Empire  was  officially  extended  to  matters  of  private  law  anyhow 
(Laufs [1973]: 744). 
  Within  the  German  Second  Empire  central  bureaucracies  got  involved  in 
promulgating federal legislation (see e.g. Schulte-Nölke [1995]). And within the Imperial 
Parliament  political  parties  that  represented  the  interests  of  citizens  of  different 
constituencies  had  to  pass  legislation  (see  e.g.  John  [1989]).  But  the  Empire  was,  of 
course, still to place the private law on a federal level of the region that was most able to 
generate economic growth. This is to say that Prussia remained able to press the case for 
incorporation of the private law that it wished for into federal legislation. By way of 
illustration, the Justice Office of the Empire had never obtained the authority to present 
legislative  proposals  without  the  prior  assent  of  the  Prussian  Ministry  of  Justice 
(Hattenhauer [1977]: 27). So, federal legislation was unlikely to embody private law that 
Prussia  violently  opposed  (Schubert  [1977]:  170).  Federal  private  laws  that  became 
operative in the German Second Empire were the Uniform Law on Copyright in the Arts 
and  Photography  (1876)  (Coing  [1986]:  4019),  the  Uniform  Law  on  Patents  (1877) 
(Coing [1986]: 4158), the Code of Bankruptcy Law (1877) (Thieme [1977]: 17), the Law 




5  Absent Prussian Approval other Members of the German Confederation Fail to 
Unify Areas of the Private Law in the 1860s 
 
At  the  three  Conferences  held  in  Würzburg  (1859,  1860,  1861)  ten  middle  states 
conceived to conduct a (common) strategy towards containment of Prussia within the 
German Confederation.
3 The first Conference of Würzburg was held from November 23
rd 
1859 until November 27
th 1859. At the time, the Hapsburg Empire had been quick to 
                                                 
3The  ten  middle  states  were  Bavaria,  Saxony,  Württemberg,  Kurhesse,  Hesse-
Darmstadt,  Saxe-Meiningen,  Saxe-Altenburg,  Braunschweig,  Nassau,  Mecklenburg-
Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz respectively.   13 
encourage the middle states to stand up to a dominant Prussia. The (first) Conference of 
Würzburg provides powerful evidence that initiatives to unify the private law within the 
German  Confederation  could  not  count  for  much  should  Prussia  not  give  its 
unconditional approval. By and large, Prussia only displayed support for uniform private 
laws that followed in large measure Prussian legislation. 
  No doubt, Prussia was to set the stage for efforts to bring pressure to bear upon 
other members of the German Confederation to incorporate Prussian legislation. Hence, 
in the early 1860s, calls of middle states in the National Assembly in Frankfurt, notably 
of Bavaria and Saxony, for codes of patent law, copyright law, civil law, as well as civil 
procedure were part and parcel of a policy geared towards strengthening the institutions 
of  the  German  Confederation  (Gruner  [1973]:  193).  However,  in  this  period,  Prussia 
could but reject schemes that tied it into a confederal structure, which might even be 
dominated by other members. In point of fact, it seems highly improbable that, in the 
1860s,  the  middle  states,  ganging  up  against  Prussia,  could  ever  have  been  able  to 
determine the (political) course of the German Confederation. This was at least in part 
because the economic dependence of the middle states of the German Confederation on 
Prussia became larger than the other way around (Kerwat [1976]: 586). In retrospect it 
seems that Prussia’s economic leverage within the German Confederation had become 
too great to be flatly ignored by the middle states. 
  To  defeat  renewed  attempts  of  the  middle  states  and  the  Hapsburg  Empire  at 
reforming the German Confederation in their own interest, Prussia was conspicuously 
absent from all deliberations on unification of the private law. Supposedly, Prussia was of 
the opinion that the Confederation lacked legal competence to address unification of the 
proposed areas of the private law. In truth, this dissenting opinion was part of a wider 
conflict between Prussia and other members of the German Confederation over the nature 
of the German political economy. In consequence, by the time the drafts of a code were 
finalized, the political basis for unification had already disappeared and, small wonder, 
much in-depth discussion had never been entered into. Indeed, a reason for the projects to 
end in utter failure was that the Hapsburg Empire and the middle states failed to secure 
the support of Prussia. As noted earlier, without Prussian assent, the projects to compose   14 
the Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange (1848) and the Commercial Code (1861) would 
also have been doomed to yield disappointing results, if not have led to outright failure. 
  After 1866, Prussia planned to codify the law specifically in the fields that the 
middle states of the German Confederation already had in mind in 1859 after the first 
Conference of Würzburg. Now that the Kingdom was influential enough to overcome 
opposition to its legislative practices, the normal method of preparing legislation within 
the North German Confederation (1867-1871) was that draft laws were prepared almost 
exclusively by Prussia alone. For example, copyright law (1871) (Vogel [1993]: 194; 
Wadle  [2003]:  50)  and  bankruptcy  law  (1877)
4  were  unified  by  Prussia  in  this  way. 
Within  the  German  Second  Empire  (1871-1914)  Prussia  managed  to  continue  this 
practice. Quite obviously, this is to suggest that, in the 1860s, Prussia had never been 
against  unification  of  the  private  law  per  se.  But  did  the  Prussian-inspired  federal 
legislation really lay down other private law than the drafts that had already been issued 
by the middle states of the German Confederation in the early 1860s? In other words, had 
Prussia  actually  had  a  need  to  delay  action  until  after  1866,  in  order  to  protect  its 
legislation against drastic revision by federal decree? Patent law is a case in point. The 
differences between the Draft of a Uniform Law on the Granting of Territorial Patents 
and the Draft of a Uniform Law on the Recognition of Patents of other Confederal States 
released by the middle states of the German Confederation in the 1860s on the one hand 
and the Uniform Law on Patents largely drafted along Prussian lines in 1877 on the other 
were profound (Beier [1974]: 203). But a salient exception to the observation that more 
often than not Prussian legislation was placed on a federal level was in respect of the law 
of obligations. The provisions of the Saxon Civil Code (1865)
5 were used as principal 
guidelines for the German Civil Code (1896) (Coing [1982]: 1553). Needless to say, that 
this could only have happened after a Prussian nod of approval (Schubert [1978]: 40). 
 
                                                 
4In this regard, Thieme ([1977]: 61) speaks of the ‘preußische Phalanx’ (Prussian 
phalanx). 
5The  coming  into  being  of  the  Saxon  Civil  Code  is  discussed  extensively  by 
Ahcin [1996].   15 
 
6  Concluding Observations 
 
Calls for unification of the private law in nineteenth-century Germany seem to have been 
motivated by ever-growing economic interdependencies amongst the respective regions, 
reflecting a desire to stop divergent regional private law from slowing down interregional 
economic activity. Early plans sketched out by German regions to unify their divergent 
laws pertaining to bills of exchange and sales are explainable in terms of this argument. 
This is a tentative conclusion because, given the available data, there is no way to tell 
with any degree of certainty when exactly unification of the private law became essential 
to facilitating the evolving interregional economic interdependence between the German 
regions. More often than not, the legal rules that Prussia wished for were placed into 
uniform private laws. Yet, the choice for the private law of Prussia was not automatically 
to imply that other German regions preferred the private law of Prussia to any other 
private law. Actually, several German regions had always jockeyed for adoption of their 
own private law into uniform laws. Instead, it seems that, from the second half of the 
nineteenth century onwards, the growing economic dependence of other German regions 
upon Prussia gave Prussia increased leverage to press for adoption of its own private law 
into uniform laws. In including the private law that Prussia wished for into uniform laws, 
other German regions  must have propelled their own economic growth by advancing 
economic activity with Prussia. Again, this is a tentative conclusion because, given the 
available data, the projected increase in economic activity with Prussia is not susceptible 
to measurement. Then, the suggestion with which the paper ends is that, although several 
German regions seem to have preferred their own private law, they might have chosen to 
introduce the private law of Prussia into uniform laws rather than any other private law 
because Prussia became able to boost economic growth the strongest in Germany in the 
nineteenth century. 
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